![]() ![]() However, as the above quote demonstrates, hermeneutic archaeology is firmly rooted in idealist epistemologies of philosophy not amenable to any kind of reductionist statement or empirical verification/falsification procedure.Ĭombined, critical and hermeneutic archaeology constitute a large part of what is known as ‘postprocessual’ archaeology in Anglo-American traditions ( see POSTPROCESSUAL ARCHAEOLOGY). It must be pointed out that some readings of this tradition suggest that external and noncultural factors constrain the production of cultural meaning and therefore may result in some broad cross-cultural similarities, a process that scientific archaeologists would call convergent evolution. This statement, of course, betrays a classic idealist stance vis-à-vis culture and history. A prominent example is Hodder and Hutson (2003:4), who, in describing the epistemological foundations of interpretative archaeology, note that cultural behavior is not reducible to broader generalizations because “culture is meaningfully constituted” (i.e., not an independent phenomenon apart from the observer) and “cultural relationships are not caused by anything else outside themselves. While usually denying it, most practitioners of hermeneutic and critical archaeology implicitly rely heavily upon some form of philosophical idealism. It is essential precisely because such language evokes different meanings from different people, a process that enriches the narrative. Ambiguity and imprecision, considered anathema by historicist and scientific archaeologists, are essential components of hermeneutic archaeology. What is meaningful from one perspective is as equally valid as any other perspective. That meaning can be different for different interpreters, and there is no hierarchy of these interpretations. Therefore, an archaeologist working in this tradition who encounters an early Greek theatre, a Southwestern US kiva, or Peruvian sunken court would seek to create a narrative of meaning that is represented in the material record. The ‘texts’ are highly affected by the readers' social, political, and cultural biases for many hermeneutic archaeologists, the context in which the archaeological record is read is as important as data themselves. In this tradition, culture and the archaeological record are ambiguous cultural texts to be ‘read’ – interpreted and reinterpreted – not explained in any scientific sense. Knowledge that reinforces asymmetrical power relations is consciously resisted (or decentered) as an explicit goal. Avidly antipositivistic, knowledge is not cumulative, but constantly reformulated. As hermeneutic practitioners would put it, “culture creates objects and objects create culture” in a recursive and complex relationship not reducible to simple linear propositions. As with critical archaeology, hermeneutic archaeology also rejects any simple or direct relationship between material culture and human behavior. Hermeneutics is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as “the art or science of interpretation….” Beginning at least with the philosopher Collingwood (with strong ties to Hegel and Kant), hermeneutic approaches to history and culture generally reject scientific epistemologies.Īs culturally constituted and irreducible, human behavior cannot be explained with reference to external factors such as the environment, technology, and so forth in hermeneutic archaeology. They likewise share a general rejection of scientific determinism or any variant of logical positivism or empiricism. Hermeneutic or interpretative archaeology draws off many of the principles of critical theory, most crucially the assumption that all knowledge is socially constructed. Charles Stanish, in Encyclopedia of Archaeology, 2008 Hermeneutic or interpretative archaeology
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |